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THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
People v. Smith, 271 Mich. 553, 260 N.W. 911 (1935). See also: State v. Smith,
100 Iowa 1, 69 N.W. 269 (1896); State v. Nikolich, 137 Wash. 62, 241 Pac. 664
(1925); Hornsby v. State, 29 Ohio App. 495, 163 N.E. 923 (1928); Scharman v.
State, 115 Neb. 109, 211 N.W. 613 (1926). In Arkansas the statutes provide that
an accessory be treated as a principal and that he "may be indicted, arraigned,
tried and punished, although the principal offender may not have been arrested
and tried, or may have been pardoned or otherwise discharged." But it has been
held that a lower court abused its discretion in trying the accessory before the
principal. Feaster v. State, 175 Ark. 165, 299 S.W. 737 (1927). It was suggested
in State v. Bogue, 52 Kans. 79, 34 Pac. 410 (1893) that the subsequent acquittal
of a principal does not carry with it the conviction against the accessory. For a
discussion of the Federal rules see: Rooney v. United States, 203 Fed. 928
(C.C.A. 9th, 1913) ; United States v. Pyle (S.D. Calif. 1921) 279 Fed. 290; Dunn
v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 52 Sup. Ct. 189, 76 L.Ed. 356 (1932).
LERoY J. GONRING.
Fixtures-Must Chattel Be Annexed to Constitute a Fixture-Louis Shapiro
mortgaged his apartment building, which was equipped with gas ranges, mechani-
cal refrigerators, and rollaway beds, to the Welfare Building and Loan Asso-
ciation. Although the ranges and refrigerators were physically connected to the
building, the rollaway beds were not. Shapiro later gave a bill of sale to the
gas ranges, refrigerators, and rollaway beds to one Leisle; but before Leisle
removed them the building and loan association foreclosed the. mortgage.
Leisle brought action against the Association alleging conversion. Held:
the ranges and refrigerators and beds were part of the realty and passed with
the realty to the Welfare Building and Loan Association. Leisle v. Welfare
Building and Loan Association (Wis. 1939) 287 N.W. 739.
In determining the question as to when personal property becomes a fixture
-the majority of the courts today apply three tests. These three tests are:
(1) actual physical annexation, (2) adaptation to the use of the realty, and
(3) the intention of the parties. Standard Oil Co. v. La Crosse Super Auto
Service, 217 Wis. 237, 258 N.W. 791 (1935). But by a survey of the decisions
of the courts which apply these tests it is readily found that the first two
criteria are used only in arriving at an understanding as to what the intention
of the parties really was at the time of the annexation; and then this intention
is used as the true basis for deciding the case. Ottumva Woolen Mill v. Haw-
ley, 44 Iowa 57, 24 Am. Rep. 719 (1876).
In the Standard Oil Case there was physical annexation-underground gaso-
line tanks and gasoline pumps-and they were adapted to the use of the realty-
a gasoline station-and yet the court held that these tanks and pumps were not
part of the realty but were still personalty because it was the intention of the
parties that they were to be considered as such. The intention in this case was
indicated by the terms of a lease which gave the Standard Oil Company the
right to remove equipment following the termination of the lease.
Also, as shown in the principal case, if there is no annexation and yet it is
the obvious intention of the parties that the property is to be considered as
part of the realty, then the courts will hold that it is realty in deference to the
original wishes of the parties. So today the major question to be decided has
been narrowed down to the intention of the person making the annexation to
make the chattel a permanent addition to the real estate; and it is only in deter-
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mining this original intention that it becomes necessary to show actual physical
annexation or the lack of it.
Where the mortgagee of a building elects to consider rollaway beds as per-
sonalty, as evidenced by the fact that he requested a chattel mortgage on them
in addition to his mortgage on the realty, the court will consider his expressed
intention and hold that the beds are chattels even though they are peculiarly
adapted to the use of the realty. Thuma v. Granada Hotel Corp., 269 I1. App.
484 (1933). Thus, the question of adaptability is now also being regarded only as
evidence as to the intention of the parties.
Rollaway beds are held to be part of the realty when it is the intention of
the vendor of the realty that the beds are to be "dedicated to the realty." Thus,
when the realty was an apartment building and the beds were adapted to the
use of the premises, and the vendor waited for over a year after the sale of the
building to assert his claim and then only after being vexed by a law-suit
brought by the vendee against him, it was held that the obvious intention of
the vendor was shown, and that the beds were part of the realty. Doll v. Guthrie,
233 Ky. 77, 24 S.W. (2d) 947 (1929). Also when a clause in the mortgage
expressly states that rollaway beds, which are unattached to the realty, are to
be covered by the mortgage, the beds will be deemed part of the realty because
the mortgage shows that that is the actual intent of the parties. First Mortgage
Bond Co. v. London, 259 Mich. 688, 244 N.W. 203 (1932).
But mere secret intention of one of the parties is not sufficient. The defend-
ant in a foreclosure action, who had the secret intention that corn cribs on his
property were to be considered as personal property, found the court ruling
against him even though the cribs were not attached to the realty because the
court decided that in this case the adaptability of the chattel to the use of the
premises would be the major factor to consider in the absence of proof of
expressed intention. Cornell College v. Crain, 211 Iowa 1343, 235 N.W. 731
(1931).
However, there may be situations in which factors other than the intention
of the original parties become important, such as the natural equities of third
parties, for example, where a mortgagee lends money on realty to which a condi-
tional vendee has attached chattels not yet paid for. This problem is discussed
in a note by Carl Luther, The Law of Fixtures as Affected by the Relationship
of the Litigants (1939) 23 MAxQ. L. Ray. 136.
Romar P. HBZ..
Taxation-Privilege Dividend Tax.-Wisconsin imposed upon all corpora-
tions doing business in the state a "Privilege Dividend Tax" which taxed the
privilege of declaring and receiving dividends out of income derived from prop-
erty located and business transacted in the state. Wis. STATS. (1939) § 71.60(3).
This section requires the corporation to deduct the amount of the tax from the
dividend declared and pay it to the state.
The plaintiff is a Delaware corporation with its principal office in New
York. It maintains no executive offices in Wisconsin. In 1937 the Wisconsin Tax
Commission assessed a privileged dividend tax on that part of the dividend
declared by the plaintiff in New York derived from income earned in Wiscon-
sin during the years of 1934, 1935 and 1936. The plaintiff contended that the
tax violated the Fourteenth Amendment in that it deprived the plaintiff corpora-
tion of its property without due process of law. The Supreme Court of the
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